We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3 percent of the incremental revenue from membership increases. The elasticity between ministers' pay and parish size is similar to the firm size elasticity of compensation for public company CEOs. Ministers receive especially strong rewards for attracting new parishioners from other congregations within their denomination. 
Introduction
The Holy Bible and The Wealth of Nations are two of the most influential books in history. These texts can differ when evaluating the importance of financial contracts (see, for instance, Jesus's treatment of the Money Changers). Nevertheless, the quotations above show that both the Bible and Adam Smith endorse the concept of a sound remuneration system for members of the clergy.
In this paper we investigate the compensation arrangements of a large sample of pastors who minister to United Methodist congregations in the American Midwest. We evaluate whether clergy receive meaningful pay-for-performance incentives, an arrangement that might seem unlikely for a number of reasons. Ministers are called to their work because of strong intrinsic motivation, which might negate any need for explicit performance incentives.
1 Strong pay-for-performance incentives might damage a minister's credibility with a congregation that questions his motivation or commitment. Finally, churches have no clear motive or mechanism for establishing incentive contracts, because they are not-for-profit entities that lack residual claimants (Fama and Jensen, 1983) .
Notwithstanding these obstacles to efficient contracting, we find abundant evidence that we argue that ministers' incentives operate as a type of sharing rule, by which a pastor is paid close to 3 percent of the incremental revenue that typically accrues to a church when a new member joins. These effects translate to a pay elasticity with respect to membership of approximately 0.35, virtually identical to the pay-firm size elasticity found for corporate CEOs (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988) . This equivalence suggests either that ministers have lower intrinsic motivation than we believe (and therefore need CEO-like incentives), or that CEOs' work gives them substantial internal satisfaction that is typically ignored (Carlin and Gervais, 2009 ).
After establishing the presence of performance pay in ministers' compensation, our paper investigates two implications of standard agency theory. Our first tests involve the rewards for 1 Principal-agent frameworks that admit both intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives (e.g., Besley and Ghatak, 2005 ) exhibit a first-order substitution between the two. For any desired level of effort, intrinsically motivated workers require lower performance pay, allowing the principal to save on labor costs.
2 For brevity, we use the term "Methodist" in place of the fuller name of the denomination, the United Methodist Church. The United Methodist Church as it currently stands was formed in 1968 via a merger between the Methodist Church and the Evangelical United Brethren Church. In our sample, nearly all of the United Methodist churches came from the original Methodist denomination. different types of actions taken by a pastor. When an agent can work on multiple tasks, as a minister might, theory predicts that pay-for-performance rewards for each task should vary.
Incentives should be stronger when a task yields higher marginal returns to the agent's effort, and also when the agent incurs a lower marginal cost of supplying effort for each respective task.
If the rewards from different tasks are equivalent, then the incentives should simply track the marginal cost of each task. Our second tests involve the familiar trade-off between risk and incentives. The standard prediction is that in more risky settings where output is a poor signal of effort, firms should use less performance pay. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find strong evidence that a minister's compensation reflects his marginal cost of effort. A minister's annual salary increases by about $18 when a member joins who is currently unaffiliated with any church ("by profession of faith"). Thus, what is optimal depends on the party asking the question -for the local church, paying for sheep stealing is optimal, while for the overall Methodist body, paying for such transfers is wasteful. Our data allow us to observe the different incentives between the local church and the "Methodist Conference," the central governing body that re-assigns ministers between churches every few years. Although the Conference does not set a minister's pay, they can influence compensation indirectly by promoting (demoting) him to a larger (smaller) church.
We find that these promotion incentives are used to counteract local churches' rewards for sheep stealing. When reassigning ministers, the Conference is more likely to send a pastor to a better paying church only if he has increased net membership to the Methodist faith, and not if increases have resulted from poaching members from other Methodist parishes.
Our final tests consider the impact of risk upon a minister's compensation. When a pastor's private effort and measurable output are weakly correlated, then a risk averse minister will reduce effort (e.g., Holmstrom (1979) We test for cross-sectional differences in incentive pay that depend upon the risk borne by the minister. Our first proxy is the volatility of the church's membership rolls. We find that a church with volatility above the median pays its minister roughly 50% less sensitive pay-forperformance incentives than a counterpart church with volatility below the median (controlling for church size). Our second test exploits the fact that some regions of Oklahoma are particularly exposed to oil prices. For churches that lie in such oil-sensitive areas, church attendance (and the local economy) fluctuates with oil prices, exogenous shocks that impose risk upon the minister. We find that pay-for-performance in churches that are particularly sensitive to oil prices is significantly lower than in churches without such exposure. Together, these results provide support for one of the most standard predictions of agency theory, but one that is often difficult to test cleanly.
Our paper contributes to several lines of research in finance and economics. A nascent literature has studied the role of incentive compensation in the non-profit sector. Leading papers include Hallock (2002) and Brickley and Van Horn (2002) . Although non-profits comprise a significant portion of the national economy, they face few disclosure requirements and therefore are rarely studied by empirical economists. A large literature, reviewed by Iannaccone (1998) , examines the economics of religion. Several prior papers in this area have studied the compensation of clergy, all of them using cross-sectional data to estimate the determinants of 4 Specifically, delegation of duties is more likely to occur when agents face uncertainty about the types of activities that they should be working on. Prendergast (2002) (2005) and Prendergast (2007) .
Our analysis is limited to the day-to-day activities of ordinary church pastors who deliver sermons on Sundays and minister to their congregations during the rest of the week. Some charismatic American clergymen have earned fortunes through book royalties, televangelism, and charging fees for access to sacred texts, but those entrepreneurial activities are beyond the scope of our study and probably have little overlap with the work of the Midwestern clergy in our sample.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our data.
Section III presents our analysis of pay-for-performance for clergy in hundreds of Oklahoma Methodist parishes. Section IV concludes.
II. Data description and background
Our study uses data on pastoral compensation provided to us by a unit of the United The remaining part of Table 1 describes the church characteristics used in our analysis.
Membership equals the cumulative number of people who have joined the church, less the number who have withdrawn. Becoming a member is distinct from attending church events or services, which anyone may do. Membership requires no formal commitment beyond an oath to support the church with one's "prayers, presence, gifts, and service." However, joining the church may require some investment of time, such as attending classes for new members or (in some circumstances) becoming baptized, and members are solicited to support church activities financially and otherwise. In addition to data about each church's membership, we have information about the rates of attendance at Sunday services and Sunday School. On average, about a third of a church's members attend a given Sunday's worship services, and about 70% of those attending worship will also attend Sunday School.
We track membership changes from year to year for each parish. Churches frequently lose and gain individual members, around 18 on average per parish for both gains and losses.
These changes tend to negate one another, so that the overall membership change variable (∆Members) indicates that net membership changes are small, with a median value of zero and inter-quartile ranges of +6 and -3.
Members can be added to the church via Professions of Faith, from Another Denomination, or from Another Methodist congregation. Profession of Faith occurs when someone simultaneously joins the United Methodist Church and the Christian religion. Two particularly common ways this occurs are when an adult converts to Christianity from another or no religion, and when an adolescent undergoes "confirmation," at or about age 13. Members can be removed for many of the same reasons they are added. For example, churches can lose members to Other Denominations or to Other Methodist churches. In addition, members can be removed for Action or can Withdraw. Removal for Action usually occurs after an extended period of inactivity. Withdrawing from the church usually coincides with exit from Protestant Christianity (otherwise Other Denomination is specified), although this is self-reported and not verified upon exit. Finally, members can be removed by Death.
These reasons for joining or leaving a parish differ substantially in the extent to which a parish's senior minister may be involved. Clearly, some events are completely beyond his or her control. Death is the most obvious example, as is being removed for Action. Others require more involvement. The one likely to require the most pastoral effort is adding members through Professions of Faith. Within the un-churched community, it is difficult to identify those individuals most receptive to church membership, greatly increasing the search cost associated when attempting to reach such "non-believers." The next most demanding category for pastors is recruiting new members from among other Christian denominations. The category requiring the least pastoral involvement is adding members from other Methodist churches. Here, doctrinal issues or beliefs are less likely to be a consideration, requiring the minister only to "sell" his particular church, not the entire religion. Search costs for the pastor and switching costs for the parishoner should both be low, because when a member of sister Methodist congregation becomes disenchanted, that member may naturally look to join other Methodist churches. Gaining these members may require little more effort from a pastor than returning a phone call.
We tabulate information about annual parish revenues in Table 1 . A church's financial health invariably depends upon the voluntary giving or "tithing" of its members. Revenues at the church level are not explicitly reported by our data source, but we can infer annual revenue from each church's reported expenses (including capital improvements to property and equipment), plus the change in the church's other assets (mainly, cash), less the change in total debt.
Inspection of the data reveals some problems with the timing of changes in debt and other assets relative to the expenditures, so we use two-year averages for these numbers, akin to a mid-year convention. The median (mean) church-year in our sample has about $65,000 ($174,000) in revenue, corresponding to median (mean) revenue per member of $315 ($355).
III. Evidence of pastoral incentive compensation

A. Basic pay-for-performance models
We begin our investigation by estimating basic linear pay-for-performance regressions over our sample of more than 2,200 Methodist ministers. We use a fixed effects specification that assigns a unique intercept to each minister-church pair, because both the pastor and the congregation members might influence either pay or performance. For example, a particular minister might be a gifted orator from the pulpit, and a particular church may have members that are especially devout or generous. A particular minister-church pairing may succeed if a certain pastor connects better with a rural congregation, or if his theology aligns better with the local church. Our specification is:
where i indexes ministers, j churches, and we allow for k = 1,.., n measures of performance.
Note that the intercepts capture the average pay for each ij minister-church pair, and we decompose each performance measure into a component that is constant for a given ministerchurch pair, Performance k,ij , and a time-varying component, Performance k,ijt −1 . Churches each fall recommend compensation adjustments for their pastors based on observed outcomes over the previous year, so our performance measures are all lagged one year. We treat the error term, η ijt , as heteroskedastic, permitting it to have persistence within churches and a common component across churches in a particular year. We then take first differences and estimate:
where we include indicator variables, Year t , to account for common changes in compensation across the state for a particular year. We calculate robust standard errors following White (1980), and allow for serial correlation by clustering observations at the church level. Table 2 shows the regression results. In the first column, we use the change in church membership as an estimate of a pastor's performance. Consistent with a pay-for-performance hypothesis, the membership variable has a positive and significant estimate, with a magnitude of about $11 per new member. We find similar results in the next two columns when the performance measures are the increase in each parish's average attendance and the increase in its Sunday School attendance. Both of these variables exhibit positive and significant estimates with magnitudes of about $5 and $7 per congregant, respectively.
Perhaps the most striking result of Table 2 is what does not appear to influence the minister's compensation -the church's revenues. At first, this result is puzzling, but for at least two reasons it may be not the case. First, the church's strategic objective might be to serve the greatest number of parishioners, instead of taking in the most revenue. However, an alternative explanation is that revenues are at best a noisy signal of pastoral effort, because church donations are likely to depend heavily on external factors linked to the economy. Figure 2 , showing a close connection between per capita income in Oklahoma and median church revenue, is consistent with this conjecture.
As robustness checks on the estimates in Table 2 , we estimate a regression with all four independent variables together, with results shown in column 5, and an additional model shown in column 6 with the dependent variable equal to the change in the pastor's salary only, instead of his change in total compensation. We find that when all variables are included together the estimate for the attendance variable weakens considerably, while the others remain essentially unchanged. Changing the dependent variable to equal salary only has little impact upon the estimates, a pattern that we find in all our models throughout the paper. To save space in subsequent tables, we generally tabulate only results based upon total compensation.
We investigate some alternative pay-performance specifications in Table 3 . In the first two columns of the table, we regress the pastor's change in total compensation against the change in membership, including one and two lagged values, respectively. The estimates show that churches tie compensation not only to contemporaneous changes in membership, but also to changes occurring in the recent past. The estimated total impact of a new member upon the pastor's compensation would equal the sum of the coefficients of these lagged values, or about $15, compared to an estimate of $11 when just the contemporaneous first difference in membership appears in the regression. Note that sample sizes for these regressions drop substantially compared to those in Table 2 , because higher-order lags of data do not exist for many pastor-church combinations.
So far, our empirical specification has measured incentive compensation with dollar sensitivities (e.g., dollars per new member), rather than with percentage sensitivities scaled by the size of the church. However, in order to compare our results to those among corporate CEOs, we also calculate elasticities, relying on this comparison because it is invariant to the overall size of the enterprise (see Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier, forthcoming, for a theoretical justification). We estimate this alternative model in the third column of Table 3 , which shows the association between the log of a pastor's compensation and the log of congregation size. The estimate, which represents the elasticity of pay with respect to congregation size, is highly significant with magnitude of 0.35, indicating that ministers' pay rises by approximately onethird when congregation size doubles. This effect is surprisingly close to the typical estimate of 0.30 firm-size elasticity found among major company CEOs (e.g., Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988; Murphy, 1999) .
To the extent that churches and public companies both offer efficient contracts, the similar performance incentives between ministers and CEOs suggests that the intrinsic motivation among ministers may be no higher than that of their executive counterparts. A number of studies have examined the role of intrinsic motivation among occupations with lowpowered monetary incentives such as social workers, civil servants, teachers, and bureaucrats (e.g., Prendergast, 2007 and 2008) . Goodsell (2004) As a check on our documentation of clerical pay-for-performance, we obtained information about the pay scale of ministers from another denomination, the Episcopal Church, in another area of the U.S., the state of Pennsylvania. We find a broad similarity in pay practices, with Episcopal priests earning more as the size of their churches increases, although we do not have a panel dataset that would allow us to replicate the types of pay-performance tests reported in this paper. The elasticity between congregation size and the pay of Episcopalian priests in Pennsylvania appears to be about one-third less than the elasticity we find in our sample of Oklahoma Methodist ministers, but it is still quite positive and significant, and the overall level of compensation is higher for Episcopal priests in Pennsylvania compared to Methodist ministers in Oklahoma for the same level of congregation size.
B. Incentives and effort costs
When an agent can choose among several activities, the principal compares the agent's marginal cost associated with each activity against the principal's marginal benefit. Holding the latter constant, an optimal contract will encourage the agent to exert effort in the least costly dimension. Such a contract allows the principal to maximize his benefits, as the agent spends time on those activities that are the least costly to implement.
Testing of this implication requires a multi-tasking setup in which one can infer both the productivity and cost associated with a number of different activities. Our data are well suited to this purpose, as we can focus in more detail on which categories of new members are associated with the strongest performance incentives. We classify new members into three types: to and from other Methodist churches, to and from non-Methodist Christian churches, and those unaffiliated with any church. Each type of membership differs in the amount of effort required for a pastor to recruit and maintain them, and they may or may not have different incremental value to a parish. We believe that converting the un-churched is the most difficult recruiting work for a pastor, because it requires leading the new member through three distinct steps: Table 4 . As we expect, pastoral compensation exhibits much greater sensitivity to intra-denominational transfers if the minister works in an urban location.
Our regression results are consistent with the hypothesis that ministers receive the strongest incentives to undertake those tasks requiring the least effort. However, this interpretation ignores the possibility that separate categories of members may bring differential benefits to a congregation. We investigate this possibility with regression analysis in Table 5 , studying first-difference estimates of changes in parish revenue as a function of lagged changes in different categories of membership. In the first column, estimates indicate that a new member (regardless of category) leads to a significant increase in church revenue of about $451 the next year, while a member lost has a negative effect upon revenue that is much smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant. We find that membership changes in either direction have slightly larger impacts upon parish revenue if we include lagged terms of the independent variables (results not tabulated to save space). Combining these results with the estimates in Table 4 , we can characterize ministers' pay-for-performance rewards as a type of sharing rule.
If a new member typically donates $451 annually to the church, and the pastor's compensation rises by $15, we would conclude that 3 percent of the incremental revenue stream from a new member is dedicated to compensation. We can develop more refined estimates of this statistic by using several lagged values of membership changes, but all are in a neighborhood near 3 to 5 percent. In the other direction, the financial penalty sustained by a pastor when a member leaves the church can be characterized as 4 percent of the incremental lost revenue stream, which equals the quotient of $6.68 (from Table 4 ) divided by $154 (from Table 5 ).
In the second column of Table 5 we investigate whether some types of new members are worth more to the church than others in financial terms. 7 The more detailed regression model's estimates indicate that new members of all types tend to donate to the church, although the estimate is not significant for those joining due to professions of faith. The most ardent donors appear to be those that convert to Methodism and leave another religious denomination (roughly $1450), over three times that of transfers from other Methodist churches (roughly $450).
However, differences among these three categories are not statistically significant. We find large decreases in parish revenue when a member leaves to join another United Methodist congregation (roughly $850) or another denomination (roughly $950), although only the first is statistically significant. These estimates are generally noisy with fairly large standard errors, and not significantly different from one another. Among the categories of membership departures, almost no change in church revenue occurs when a member dies, withdraws from the practice of Christianity (very rare), or is dropped from the parish rolls due to inactivity; in all three of these cases the member probably had been providing little support to their parish due either to ill health or indifference.
From our analysis we conclude that little significant difference exists in the benefits obtained from different classes of new church members. This suggests that our results shown in 7 Members of a church congregation are obviously valued for reasons beyond their willingness to donate. Iannaccone (1998 Iannaccone ( , pp. 1482 Iannaccone ( -1483 writes that "In congregational settings, an active member (who attends regularly, sings wholeheartedly, and greets others enthusiastically) increases the utility of other members." Table 4 , indicating that churches pay a premium for ministers to recruit new members from one another's flocks, represent the outcome of a contract that is largely based upon expected effort levels, rather than expected revenue gains. Methodist ministers are implicitly encouraged to devote effort to recruiting parishioners from other Methodist parishes, since an incremental amount of time spent by a pastor in this way should increase his congregation size more quickly than the same effort spent recruiting non-Methodists or the un-churched.
The evident weakness of these contracts lies in their collective interaction, which encourages ministers to prey upon one another's congregations in a competition for members that will ultimately amount to a zero sum game. Prendergast (1999) 
reviews a number of
examples where what appears like optimal incentive structures can have unintended (and often negative) side effects. Usually, this manifests through workers who attempt to "game the system," and in so doing, mitigate the intended effects of the incentive contracts they are offered.
We find a similar effect in our data. Therefore, it would not be surprising for the Conference, the supervising authority over a large number of parishes, to discourage the incentives for ministers to steal from each other's "flock."
To gain some insight into this, we present in Table 6 the results of estimating equation (2) for only those years in which ministers are reassigned to different churches. These are the only years in which the Conference directly influences the minister's pay, via its ability to send him to a smaller or larger church. 8 Table 6 shows the striking result that the Conference's objective, as revealed by what activities it rewards, differs from that of local churches.
The first column in Table 6 begins by examining whether pay changes due to moves are related to changes in membership, revenues, or attendance at the previous church. As the results indicate, pay increases that result from new appointments are significantly related to membership changes at the minister's previous church. In addition, the point estimates suggest a larger impact than we observed for within-church changes in pay. Conditional on a move, a new member is associated with an approximately $31 increase in total compensation, versus the $11 estimated in Table 2 for within-church changes.
In the second column of Table 6 
C. Risk versus incentives
Our analysis above demonstrates a connection between pastoral compensation, changes in parish memberships and a minister's costs of providing types of effort. Here, we explore a different implication of agency theory, the familiar trade-off between risk and incentives.
Despite its intuitive nature, it has proved difficult to find convincing evidence of this trade-off in cross-sectional datasets, as discussed in Prendergast (2002) . He offers one explanation: when a job is risky, the firm has more difficulty observing the agent's input. This can occur, for example, when a job is extremely complex, forcing the firm to delegate to the agent substantial discretion in how he allocates his effort among several tasks. When workers have such discretion, firms cannot monitor effort very well, and so are forced to compensate workers on the only signal available -output. Consequently, in some cases, a positive relation may exist between risk and incentive pay. A second problem we acknowledge is that workers may selfselect into more or less risky professions and job assignments, depending on private information about their own risk aversion, private costs of effort, and so forth.
Two features of our data alleviate these concerns, affording us a particularly sharp test of risk versus incentives. First, our proxies for risk are unlikely to change the nature of the job.
Regardless of the parish, a minister is expected to prepare for Sunday services, administer counseling and services to members of the congregation, and attempt to grow the church by reaching out to the community. In addition, because their assignments are made by the Conference, ministers have no ability to self-select into churches based upon private information or risk tolerance.
We develop two proxies for the signal-to-noise ratio of how closely membership changes reflect pastoral effort at individual churches. Our first proxy is the church-level standard deviation of membership changes. We use the entire time series of up to 43 years per parish to calculate the volatility of each church's percentage changes in membership. Churches that have volatility above the sample median are grouped together and classified by an indicator variable, High Volatility. However, presupposing the result that more volatile churches pay less per new member, this finding may also be explained by a story that has nothing to do with risk. Suppose, for example, that members of more volatile churches were less likely to remain in a parish for a given length of time than their counterparts of more stable churches. Were this the case, then members with shorter horizons may, from purely an expected giving standpoint, be less of less worth to the church.
To address this possibility, we use another measure of risk not subject to such a concern.
Our second proxy utilizes oil prices as an exogenous factor that partially explains church membership. Oklahoma has a tradition of being an oil-dependent state, but not all communities are equally exposed to variation in oil prices. To the extent that a particular community's economy depends on oil, church membership would be affected at least two ways. First, an oilrelated boom might generate population growth and contribute to increased parish membership.
However, an offsetting effect may arise from the well-documented tendency of religious activity to decline amid higher wealth and income (Azzi and Ehrenber, 1975) . We show such a pattern for one Oklahoma community in Figure 3 , which graphs annual changes in membership of the Shawnee Bethel United Methodist Church against annual changes in oil prices. Shawnee is the county seat of Pottawatomie County, which in the 1920's boasted itself as "The Hub of the World's Largest Oil Fields." 9 As shown in Figure 3 , the times series of church membership changes and oil price changes behave almost as mirror images. A closer inspection of the data for this parish shows that Shawnee Bethel exhibits both countercyclical membership changes (with respect to oil prices), as well as procyclical giving per member. Each of these patterns is consistent with Gruber's (2004) finding that people substitute higher donations for church attendance based upon their marginal utilities for leisure and money.
To measure the exogenous impact of oil prices upon church membership in different parishes, we start by regressing membership for each church on lagged membership and a time trend, and calculating the r-squared of that regression (for each church). We then add contemporaneous and lagged oil prices to the regressions and calculate the improvement in the rsquared. 10 Churches with a change in r-squared greater than the median (i.e., where oil explains more of the variation in membership than the median across all churches) are grouped together and classified by an indicator variable, Oil Driven.
In Table 7 , we present regressions of changes in pastoral compensation against changes in membership, including interactions between changes in membership and the two indicator variables High Volatility and Oil Driven. We also include an interaction between changes and membership and the average size of the church over the sample in order to control for possible size effects on membership volatility or oil exposure. Estimates in column 1 of Table 7 indicate that churches with greater total variability in membership put significantly less weight on changes in membership when setting ministers' compensation. The change in total 9 See http://www.shawneeok.org/History/Default.asp. 10 Oil prices are downloaded from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE. compensation associated with one new member for a minister at a high-volatility church is about $12, compared to $23 for a minister at a low-volatility church. Similarly, the results in column 2 suggest that churches with membership driven by exogenous variation in oil prices have less pay-for-performance sensitivity. A new member in an oil-driven church is associated with a $10 increase in total compensation, compared to $18 in a less oil-driven church. Column 3 includes all interactions simultaneously and provides some evidence that the two effects are not redundant. In aggregate these results indicate that there appears to be a trade-off between the risk a minister faces, and how much he is rewarded or penalized for changes in membership. An alternative explanation of this result is that new members stay for a shorter time in more volatile churches, implying that the present value of benefits created by new members in these churches would be lower, and that churches might optimally reward a pastor less for adding less valuable members. However, in untabulated tests, we find that changes in membership are more persistent in high volatility churches, a result that is inconsistent with this conjecture.
VI. Conclusions
Our paper investigates patterns of compensation for a large panel dataset of ministers in the state of Oklahoma between 1961-2003. We find evidence that compensation follows patterns consistent with principal-agent models of optimal contracting. Although the overall level of ministerial pay is modest, it responds significantly to increases and decreases in parish membership. When we decompose membership changes into different categories, we find that the more informative types of changes are associated most strongly with changes in pastoral compensation. Pay-performance sensitivity is lower when performance variables are volatile in a given parish, and also when the church operates in an environment exposed to external economic factors such as the price of oil. Finally, the central church administration appears to use its power of ministerial assignment in order to reward productive clergy with plum appointments that bring higher total compensation, and also to counteract incentives for ministers to poach new members from one another's congregations.
These results may seem rational to scholars who study agency theory and the economics of contracting. However, they occur in a setting -a major American religious denomination -in which one might expect little or no material reward for excellent performance. Although pastors are no doubt motivated by idealism and a variety of non-pecuniary rewards, our research indicates that incremental financial incentives also impact their effort and the service they provide to parishioners. $50,000 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1986 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 Mean Oklahoma pastor's income in United Methodist Church
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